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ABSTRACT
EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES NAVY AMPHIBIOUS LANDING DOCTRINE
DURING WORLD WAR II
Jaedon A. Foreman
Director: Dr. Gregory Huckabee

Leaving World War I and heading into World War II the United States Navy had
to prepare for an unforeseen future on the open seas. After the attack on Pearl Harbor the
United States was thrust into World War II and needed an effective amphibious landing
doctrine to be able to counter adversary advances. This thesis covers the evolution of
landing doctrine from the beginning to the end of World War II while highlighting the
impacts that Operations Torch, Husky, Shingle, and Overlord had on the Navy's landing
doctrine after the war.
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Introduction
In any organization, efficient and adequate management and operating procedures
are vital to success. For the military, these goals are achieved through doctrine. Military
doctrine outlines standard procedures for training, readiness, and combat. It provides
guidance for harmonious conduct by its subcomponent commands. Throughout history,
military doctrine has had to adapt to changing technology, a changing geopolitical
climate, and constant evaluation. This thesis will evaluate the United States Navy’s
amphibious landing doctrine before, during, and in the months leading to the end of
World War II. Although there is residual decision-making left to be made at the tactical
level of warfare, there is significance in comprehending the functionality of doctrine at
the strategic level of war.
Doctrine
For the United States Department of Defense, procedures are laid out in doctrine.
While doctrine is instructional and authoritative somewhat like an order, its application
requires a level of judgment relative to the situation. 1 Doctrine may be deviated from at
the commander's discretion. Doctrine, like warfare, may be broken up into three
segments: strategic, operational, and tactical. The easiest way of viewing these types of
doctrine is as if they were a part of a tree, a doctrine tree. At the top, you have the allencompassing strategic level doctrine. Strategic level doctrine covers national policy and
independent theatre strategy. This level of doctrine focuses on utilizing national
resources for theatre level success of military operations and is directed by the President
of the United States with assistance from the National Security Council (NSC). 2 Once
1
2

(CJCSI n.d.)
(CJCS 2013)
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Strategic level doctrine is established, the Secretary of Defense relays this to combatant
commanders and joint force commanders who develop operational level doctrine, the
next tier down on the doctrine tree. While not present during World War II, Operational
level doctrine is set by each combatant commander or joint force commander with the
goal of acting in accordance with and satisfying strategic doctrine. The focus of
operational level doctrine is to “develop strategies, campaigns, and operations and
employ military forces”. 3 Operational level doctrine combines strategy and tactics to
create operational objectives necessary to meet strategic goals. Finally, the tactical level
doctrine covers the location and utilization of forces. This level of doctrine is where
actual battles, skirmishes, and engagements occur. Figure 1 shows the relationship of the
different levels of warfare which are the basis for different levels of doctrine. Doctrine is
laid out through government publications like the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and
the National Security Strategy (NSS). The National Defense Strategy outlines the
Department of Defense objectives while the National Security Strategy examines the
United States’ more broad strategy of securing the nation through all means of the
government. The NSS states that “our fundamental responsibility is to protect the
American people, the homeland, and the American way of life”. 4 Some strategies like the
NDS have classified full versions and unclassified summaries. Strategies like the NSS
are broad and open-source, non-classified materials for public dissemination. In the
unclassified release of the NDS, the Department of Defense shows what it is currently
shaping its strategic doctrine towards by saying “Inter-state strategic competition, not

3
4

(CJCS 2013)
(Trump 2017)
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Figure 1: Levels of Warfare (CJCS,2013)

terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security”. 5 The NDS and the NSS
are vital precursors to doctrine and can show where top military leaders want our doctrine
to go. Leading up to, and during World War II, the foreshadowing of doctrine was not as
publicly available as it is today.
Heading into World War II
Prior to American entry into World War I, the United States Navy embarked on a
massive naval order of battle expansion. Approved by Congress in 1916, the Naval
Expansion Act of 1916 allowed for ten battleships, six battle cruisers, ten scout cruisers,
fifty destroyers, and sixty-seven submarines to be built within the following three years. 6
Based on the theory of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the Naval Expansion Act of 1916 gained
support through the United States’ goal of a thriving nation through extensive
5
6

(Trump 2017)
(Halpern 2014)
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commercial sea lanes which required a strong naval presence for protection. 7 President
Woodrow Wilson believed that if the United States were to pursue naval expansion, that
it may undercut his efforts at obtaining a peaceful end to World War I. It was only after
German submarines began killing Americans that President Wilson realized the need for
the United States Navy to be ready to defend the nation and its people. This massive
buildup of ships prior to the war had created purpose for the First International
Conference on Limitations of Naval Armaments, also called the Washington Conference,
after the war. Starting on November 11th, 1921, this conference hosted by the United
States included representatives from eight nations including China, France, Japan, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium, and Great Britain; it ended with the establishment of a
five-nation power treaty (Five-Power Treaty) between the United States, Great Britain,
Japan, France, and Italy on February 6th, 1922. 8 During the conference, these nations
agreed to one of the first arms reduction treaties in modern history. Led by United States
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, the agreement also included provisions of
limiting tonnage of capital ships and aircraft carriers, the United States, Great Britain, and
France to scrap finite amounts of ships (1.9 million tons), set a strict ratio of capital ships
(ships weighing over 10,000 tons) and set more strict rules for surface warfare for the
Five Powers, and set a status quo for naval fortifications in the western Pacific ocean. 9
The agreements made by the United States during the First International Conference on
Limitations of Naval Armaments would shape its naval strategy leading up to its entrance
into World War II.

(Kirschbaum 2008)
(Blazich Jr. 2016)
9 (Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia 2019)
7
8

4

Japan had threatened to terminate the agreement it had made during the
Washington Conference and demanded to be treated equally with the United States and
Great Britain with respect to the buildup of capital ships. When this request was rejected
by the other Five-Power nations in 1936, Japan provided its official notice of their intent
to permanently terminate the Five-Power Treaty. 10 Also, in 1936 at the Second London
Naval Treaty, Japan and Italy refused to sign a modified version of the original treaty
signed at the Washington Conference. 11 With Japan and Italy breaking away from the

Figure 2: The United States Delegation to the conference, photographed on the steps of the State-WarNavy Building, Pennsylvania Ave. At 17th St., Washington, D.C., in November 1921. Among those
present are: Admiral Robert E. Coontz, USN Chief (National Museum of the U.S. Navy 2019)

naval agreements, western powers had to begin to prepare for an unforeseen future on the
open seas.

10
11

(E. Editors 2019)
(National Museum of the U.S. Navy 2019)
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Leading up to World War II, the Japanese military was split into two separate
entities: the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). Japan
had foreseen China, Russia, and the United States as their three main enemies for the
fast-approaching war; the IJA would primarily handle the war with China and Russia
while the IJN would primarily manage the war with the United States. 12 After conducting
their final round of war games on October 4th and 5th and with the final plan approved on
the 22nd, the Japanese were ready to launch the attack on Pearl Harbor. At 0755 a.m. on
December 7th, 1941 Japan launched its raid on Pearl Harbor killing over 2,300 Americans
and launching the United States into World War II.
Now that the United States was thrust into World War II, the United States Navy
needed to be ready to fight at all levels. To be ready to effectively fight and win the
Second World War, key United States military leaders realized that amphibious
operations would be vital to Allied success in the War. The United States Navy and
Army needed a thorough and effective amphibious landing doctrine for the war. The
United States Marine Corps utilized the Navy’s Landing Operations Doctrine, 1938 to
generate their field manual titled Landing Operations on Hostile Shores. 13 Furthermore,
the United States Army copied this instruction laid out by the Marine Corps to have its
own amphibious doctrine. This thesis will examine and analyze the changes to United
States Amphibious Doctrine through World War II from the view of landings before the
war in Landing Operations on Hostile Shores (FM 31-5) to the viewpoint during the war
in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy (FTP-155), and finally with the adoption of War

12
13

(Caravaggio 2014)
(War Department 1941)

6

Instructions 1944 (FTP-143) by Chief of Naval Operations Ernie King closer to the end
of the war.
Landing Operations on Hostile Shores
The United States Navy’s Landing Operations Doctrine was published by the
Office of Naval Operations on May 2nd, 1941. Landing Operations Doctrine supersedes
the United States Navy’s Tentative Landing Operations Manual of 1935 and is a guide
for Navy and Marine forces whose mission is to conduct land operations against
adversaries. 14 The United States Army was able to transform Landing Operations
Doctrine into their own publication on June 2nd, 1941. The resulting publication,
Landing Operations on Hostile Shores focuses on guiding strictly Army forces during
amphibious landing operations on adversary territory. 15 Divided into eleven subsections,
Landing Operations on Hostile Shores guides the war planner and fighter through each
stage of the amphibious landing.
First, Landing Operations on Hostile Shores defines the purpose of joint oversea
expeditions as “combined Army and Navy forces dispatched to a theatre of operations by
sea for the purpose of undertaking military operations ashore which may involve… the
securing of a beachhead from which to project major land operations… seizure and
securing of an area for use in connection with other military operations; or for use to
carry out further operations…seizure and securing of an area in order to deny its use to
the enemy, and the destruction of enemy installations and facilities”. 16 This doctrine lays
out four stages to successful overseas expeditions starting with the concentration and

(War Department 1941)
(War Department 1941)
16 (War Department 1941)
14
15
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specialized training phase, then the embarkation phase, the movement phase, and
finishing with the landing phase. 17 The concentration and specialized training phase
trains landing forces in similarly situated environments as the desired adversary
beachhead. The embarkation phase compiles all the applicable troops and their
equipment and transports them to the desired pre-landing location. The movement phase
occurs during the time when the troops depart the allied port and before the rendezvous at
the desired adversary landing area. Finally, the landing phase is the expeditionary
movement of troops onto the beachhead until landing forces are securely established on
the adversary shore. 18
When conducting landing operations, numerous considerations must be made.
Landing Operations on Hostile Shores outlines the need to consider the nature of
operations, special organization, and special equipment needed for a successful landing. 19
These considerations led to the distinct and outlined plans for the landing force after the
basic plan has been made with the aforementioned considerations. 20 The plans for the
landing force include planning of special training, troop movement from concentration
centers to ports of embarkations, loading the transports, and finally the plan to debark
with ship-to-shore movement and ashore operations. 21 Each stage of the planning process
requires centralization due to the complexity of oversea landing operations.
The amphibious landing is broken into three landing phases in Landing
Operations on Hostile Shores. Landing phase one includes the seizure of terrain

(War Department 1941)
(War Department 1941)
19 (War Department 1941)
20 (War Department 1941)
21 (War Department 1941)
17
18
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immediately in the rear of the beach, then when sufficient land has been secured, forces
advance inland about 10,000 yards which secures the beach from enemy light artillery
fire. 22 Moving landing forces another 15,000 yards inland denying the enemy of medium
artillery fire on the beach is the second landing phase. 23 The third and final landing phase
encompasses the entire use of land and air assets to secure the objective for which the
landing was undertaken. 24 The ultimate success of the tactical plan depends most heavily
on the first landing phase. Demonstrations are a unique and complementary phase of the
landing operation in which exhibitions of force are displayed in a way to divert enemy
reserves from tending to the main landing operation. 25 Knowing how to effectively place
forces is dependent on the landing environment. Landing areas that possess favorable
landing terrain are the most heavily fortified by the adversary. The converse is also true
due to the nature of expeditionary movement in that the least landing-favorable beaches
are not as fortified. In selecting the final location for the landing, the correct decision
considers the needs of the force and their equipment while also mitigating the capabilities
of the adversary at the location. Once the location for the landing has been selected, the
next decision that must be made is the timing of the landing. Night landings typically
ensure that tactical surprise is upheld, while daylight allows for the full employment of
naval and air support. Initial landing forces are to normally be employed under the cover
of night with the transport of the main landing force during dawn so that the main force
experiences full naval and air support. In whole, Landing Operations on Hostile Shores
describes that the effective employment of the three landing phases in conjunction with
(War Department 1941)
(War Department 1941)
24 (War Department 1941)
25 (War Department 1941)
22
23
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demonstrations, properly selected beach, and strategic timing will lead to a successful
landing operation.
The final portion of Landing Operations on Hostile Shores that is vital in
understanding the United States' view on amphibious landings heading into the war is the
ship-to-shore movement of forces onto the beachheads. Ship-to-shore movement
involves the fire and movement coordinated with small boats transporting the troops onto
shore. Leading with gunfire to both destroy and demoralize the enemy, the gunfire is to
increase in severity until “masked by the assaulting infantry”. 26 The approaching landing
infantry begins their approach to the beachhead in large columns but due to the increased
risk of loss the closer the small boats get to shore; the deployed forces break down into
smaller columns of small boats. 27 The breakdown of the small boats into smaller columns
allows for reserves to be properly positioned on the beach to capitalize on the success of
previous waves. This breakdown continues through landing groups and through boat
groups. 28
To ensure continuity of effective operations, the infantry and small boat units are
split into two groupings: the landing group and the boat group. Landing groups are
composed of and organized by a number, followed by the name of the principal
organization. For example, Landing Group No. 1 (1st Bn 1st Inf, rein) is Landing Group
Number 1 composed of the 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry, and their reinforcements. 29 Landing
groups are compiled as a table which includes all the forces in each landing group for all

(War Department 1941)
(War Department 1941)
28 (War Department 1941)
29 (War Department 1941)
26
27
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necessary landing groups. This table allocates the spaces on the small boat taken up by
the personnel and equipment for each unit in each landing group.
Small boats grouped together with the mission of transporting landing forces from
ship to shore are organized into boat groups. Each boat group is given a unique number
identifier, Boat Group 1, and is led by a naval officer who is the boat group commander.
When two or more boat groups require the command of a single officer, this organization
of boat groups is called a boat flotilla. 30 Boat divisions are composed of two or more
small boats transporting landing groups to the beachhead. Boat divisions are called by
their division and group number such as Boat Division No. 1, Boat Group No. 1. 31 Boat
groups move from sea to shore depending on the plan for the tactical employment of the
infantry battalion which is also dependent on the terrain on the landing area. During the
landing operations, reserve boat groups stand by in designated sea areas until called upon
to deploy reinforced landing forces.
The Army’s field manual, which is the exact same as the Marine Corps doctrine,
Landing Operations on Hostile Shores was the foundation for United States amphibious
landings heading into World War II. This doctrine focused on the importance of
planning and strong force organization for successful landings. Landing Operations on
Hostile Shores outlined the importance of coordination between the United States Navy
and the Army as a basis for further successful landings. 32 In the years following Landing
Operations on Hostile Shores and during World War II, the United States Navy and the
Army modified existing joint doctrine to better establish amphibious landing procedures.

(War Department 1941)
(War Department 1941)
32 (War Department 1941)
30
31
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The resulting updated doctrine, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy of July 14th, 1941
outlined improved command, planning, and embarkation measures to guide the United
States Army and Navy through the rest of the war.
Joint Action of the Army and the Navy
The goal of the newly revised Joint Action of the Army and the Navy was to better
coordinate action between the Army and the Navy to produce the most effective support
which is vital to the success realized in war. 33 Joint Action of the Army and the Navy
established a clear and mutual understanding of the functions executed by each branch
for attaining optimal coordination of effort during the operation.
Joint Action of the Army and the Navy outlines the general functions of the Army
and the Navy together and separately in Chapter 1 of the publication. Together, the
Army and the Navy defend the United States from foreign and domestic enemies. They
jointly accomplish this by complementing each other’s foundational mission set. The
Army focuses on land superiority while the Navy maintains sea superiority. In joint
operations, the Army and the Navy must work together with one equivalent branch
commander supporting the other branch commander in charge of the operation. 34 During
joint operations, the respective branches should refrain from establishing operational
limitations on the other and should instead focus on collaboration resulting in operation
success. 35 The Army supports the Navy in terms of the establishment and defense of
naval bases and by providing the adequate number of forces needed for joint overseas
expeditions. The Navy complements Army operations through maintaining access and

(Board 1935)
(Board 1935)
35 (Board 1935)
33
34
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control of sea lanes vital to the national security interests of the nation as a whole. The
control of these sea lanes maintained by the United States Navy allows for United States
Army access to the entire world which in turn allows the Army to provide the Navy ports
in these new nations.
Joint actions between the Army and the Navy require principled leadership and
effective communication with the focus on victory. To determine the commander of such
operations, the services determine, through joint operation planning, which branch has
paramount interest; 36 the service whose operations are of greater importance to the
accomplishment of a joint mission. The commander of the joint force is vested with
control of the operation and the responsibility for effectively coordinating and executing
for victory. 37 The commander can accomplish this through the exercise of unity of
command or limited unity of command. Unity of command is established when one
commander is provided the responsibility of the entire operation supplemented by
support provided by the other service branch commensurate commander. 38 This
established commander can coordinate forces from both services for the operation. This
is the major difference from limited unity of command where the joint operation
commander does not have the ability to control the action of the opposite service. 39
Conducting joint overseas expeditions, including amphibious landings, regardless of the
unity of command structure, requires clear communication and proper planning.
The joint operation planning process for amphibious landings is unique in that it
requires oversight of both the Army and the Navy. When the decision is made to conduct
(Board 1935)
(Board 1935)
38 (E. King 1944)
39 (Board 1935)
36
37
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such an operation, the authority arriving at this conclusion will issue a directive to the
commander of the combined force being utilized for the operation. 40 The directive will be
detailed and include but not limited to the following: 41
1. Digest of available information of the enemy.
2. Information of any prior operations undertaken that might have an influence upon
the proposed operation.
3. Information of any supporting operations contemplated.
4. The joint mission and, if required, the separate missions for the Army and the
Navy.
5. The outline of the operations that probably will be required to accomplish the
mission or missions, with designation of the initial theatre of operations.
6. The force assigned to carry out the operations with times and places of
concentration and availability for embarkation.
7. The type of special equipment and supplies that may be needed.
8. The availability of sea transportation and the responsibility for its procurement
and operation.
9. The method of coordination. The designation of the commander in chief under
the method of unity of command; or the designation of the service in which
paramount interest will be vested during each phase, with the designation of the
respective commanders of the Navy and Navy forces.
10. Any further information or instructions that may be considered of importance in
order to give the commander in chief or the respective commanders of the Army
40
41

(Board 1935)
(Board 1935)
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and Navy forces the benefit of all studies made which might have a bearing on the
success of the expedition.
It is of significant importance that the authority is as detailed and clear as possible
when issuing the directive to the applicable commander. Once the directive is received
by the selected commander of the joint force, this commander will issue an instruction
further down the chain of command to the respective commanders of the Army and Navy
forces required for the execution of the plan. 42 The instruction passed down from the
joint commander will include but is not limited to: 43
1. Decision
2. Such additional assignments of the Army and Navy missions as appear to be
necessary.
3. Operations to be undertaken, including both, join operations and such separate
Army and Navy operations as are considered to be necessary to ensure the success
of the expedition, together with the designation of the respective task forces
required and their commanders.
4. Announcement of selected landing areas.
5. Times and places of embarkation, departure, and rendezvous.
6. Provision for joint training.
7. Provision for logistic support of the expedition.
8. Provision for communications (signal) between forces.
9. Announcement of the hour of landing. Often this may not be announced until
shortly before the landing forces are ready to embark.
42
43

(Board 1935)
(Board 1935)
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10. Alternative plans.
The above instructions will be provided to the appropriate commanders of both the
specific Army and Navy forces needed to carry out the operation. With full detailed
instructions, the third echelon of commanders will better be able to ready their forces and
provide the requisite training needed for operational success. Once the third and final
echelon of commanders has the requisite information on the operation, the forces begin
the preparatory phase of the joint operation. 44
First, the medium of sea transportation must be clearly established between the two
branches. Unless otherwise stated by the plan or directive, the commander of the force
having paramount interest will have the necessary transportation vehicle requested or
built through the Navy or War Departments. Next, the port of embarkation is chosen,
organized, and managed by agencies of the War Department. Then at the more tactical
level, the Army forces reduce, as much as possible, the equipment they bring with them
to the absolutely necessary items to conduct the operation. While reduction occurs, it is
vital to operational success that this reduction does not, in turn, reduce force lethality and
ability to obtain mission success. Special equipment needed by the joint force will be
provided by the Navy. Special equipment, in this case, includes that which will be
utilized to protect the Army forces on land; machine guns, barges, and landing craft for
the Army’s artillery, tanks, and supplies. After such reduction plans are made, joint
training occurs due to the inherent intricacies of landing large Army forces with little sea
experience on a hostile shore and with Naval forces unfamiliarity of land operations. 45
Embarkation planning occurs after training is completed and includes determining the
44
45
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exact number of personnel (officer, warrant officer, and enlisted) and equipment and their
respective space needed to transport. Other aspects of the embarkation cannot be planned
due to the ever-changing nature of amphibious landings. The final phase of the
preparatory stage is the loading of the previously mentioned units. Loading is conducted
using two main methods: (1): Commercial Loading and (2) Unit Loading. Commercial
loading utilizes maximum ship space regardless of tactical employment of Army forces
while unit loading considers the need for Army forces to be tactically employed. 46 The
decision on which loading method to be used depends on the objective and location of the
joint operation. If the force is strictly being transported from one secured base to another
secured base, then commercial loading will be utilized. Conversely, if the objective is to
invade an enemy shoreline and tactical employment of Army forces is required, then unit
loading will be used. After the method of transportation is decided, the Army and Navy
forces begin the transit overseas.
Inherently, the Navy is responsible for the protection of all assets and lines of
communication during sea transit. 47 The naval commander of the joint operation will
procure a convoy and escort for the transit. A selected naval officer will be placed in
command of each component of the convoy. While the sea transit occurs, Army
personnel aboard the Navy vessels cannot interfere with the conduction of safe convoy
and escort for the transit. Upon successful transit to the area of operations, the Army
forces are ready to deploy to the shore and conduct offensive operations.
Offensive amphibious landing operations conducted on enemy shores will utilize both
Navy and Army aircraft support as much as possible. The Army has three successive
46
47

(Board 1935)
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phases for the joint operation. The first phase includes acquiring terrain in the rear of the
beach. When supplementary forces arrive, Army forces will then advance and secure
additional portions of the shore to the extent that secures the beach from enemy short
artillery fire (10,000 yards). Eliminating the enemy’s ability to launch medium-range
artillery fire (15,000 yards) is the objective of the second phase. Waves of forces will be
made by as frequently as needed given land and sea abilities and to achieve the required
object. However, additional forces will not be employed to the point of detrimental
dispersion. While the Army achieves its objective on land, the Navy provides support
from the nearby sea.
During the landing operation, the Navy is responsible for ensuring that all Army
personnel arrive on the coast as safe as possible. This includes employment of naval
aviation assets, signals communications, and all other functions necessary to ensure the
landing of Army forces on the coast. The Navy will organize its forces by the following
subgroups:
1. The fire support group, consisting of combatant naval vessels which are assigned
the following fire missions: Against enemy troops opposing the landing or against
their probable positions; against reserves; against hostile machine guns and hostile
artillery; and on hostile routes of advance or retreat. Effective results may further
be obtained by close-in support of light vessels, such as destroyers, delivering
direct fire
2. The air group, consisting of naval aircraft, for observations of gunfire of the fire
support group and the Army’s artillery, for protection of the attack force against
enemy air operations, for reconnaissance of enemy positions, for bombing enemy
18

objectives, and for liaison with the Army forces. Where practicable, observation
units should support each division's landings. It should be noted, however, that
the fleet air forces, in the theatre of operations, other than planes carried on
battleships and cruisers, are normally organized into a single task force, with the
mission of supporting the landing of the expeditionary force and the operations of
the attacking forces.
3. The mine group, consisting of mine-laying vessels and mine sweepers for the
purpose of sweeping the landing area clear of enemy mines and of laying
defensive mines to protect the vessels of the attack force from enemy submarines
and night torpedo attack.
4. The antisubmarine group, consisting of the vessels designated to protect against
the vessels of the attack force from attack by enemy submarines.
5. The transport group, consisting of the transports and all noncombatant vessels
carrying troops, equipment, and supplies.
6. The screening group, consisting of those vessels designated to locate and give
warning of the approach of enemy vessels attacking if possible. This group
usually includes the submarines accompanying the expedition.
7. Salvage group, consisting of such light craft as may be available for rescuing
personnel of distressed boats, hauling off grounded boats, and the recovery of
sunken equipment.
These subgroups will help obtain, secure, and maintain the landing area for the joint
operation. While the selection of the landing area is dependent on tactical considerations,
the Army and the Navy both have their respective viewpoints on the ideal landing area.
19

The Army views a beneficial landing area as an area which will permit both approach and
landings from a broad front commensurate with the size of the landing force, afford
sufficient amount of favorable beaches for landing, contain no natural obstacles hindering
beach-advance but contain natural obstacles that provide flanking cover, afford for
sufficient inland force maneuvering and beachhead establishment, and permit the landing
of heavy equipment including artillery, supplies. 48 Conversely, the Navy suggests
selecting a landing area free from severe obstructions to navigation, not have a beach
slope that could cause beaching of a vessel, and be sheltered from harsh sea conditions
that could impede landing operations or their support. 49 Between the Army and the Navy,
the landing area is chosen based on a reasonable probability to achieve the underlying
objective. The principle of paramount interest also applies here, and it is deemed by
Joint Action of the Army and the Navy that paramount interest in the selection of the
landing area will fall upon the Army due to their employment onshore is considered
paramount. 50 Accompanying the selection of the landing area is the selection of the hour
of landing.
The decision made on the hour of landing also falls on the commander of the
force having paramount interest. Consideration taken is to advantages of landing during
dark or light conditions and for the possibility of the utilization of smoke. While landing
during the dark offers tactical surprise and reduced expected troop loss, landing during
the daylight affords more effective support to Army forces through aviation and naval
assets. Regardless of the time chosen and from an Army standpoint, there must follow
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sufficient daylight for Army forces to accomplish the objective of their first phase. From
a Navy standpoint, the approach must be made in a manner that minimizes the risk of
detection. This includes necessary mine-sweeping and laying operations to protect the
landing of Army forces.
A key to a successful amphibious landing operation is the effective employment
of aviation assets and naval gunfire support. Army air units will be deployed as early as
possible with Navy air assets being used to complement and supplement their Army
counterparts. Naval gunfire support to the landing Army units will be the only type of
that kind provided in the beginning stages of the landing. Two methods are laid out in
Joint Action of the Army and the Navy pertaining to the employment of naval gunfire in
support of multiple Army ground forces. The first method established control over the
naval gunfire to the highest-ranking commander of the Army ground forces, while the
second method splits up the naval gunfire support amongst the Army ground forces. The
choice between the two methods is made at the tactical level. Nevertheless, the
organization of the Army forces on the landing area remains consistent.
Army force organization on the beach is vital to the success of the landing
operation. The organization of forces on the beach is broken down into six categories.
First, the beachmaster, a Navy officer, commands the area from the high-water mark
seaward. 51 Landing with the first wave of infantry, the beachmaster manages Army
messages from shore to the supporting ships at sea. Second, the shore party commander,
an Army officer, is appointed for each beach at which a landing is to be made. 52 The
shore commander takes command of all engineer and labor troops and their movement
51
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along with maneuver of equipment, supplies, and coordinates with the shore party
commander. Third, due to the inherent confusion associated with the amphibious
landing, military police forces are deployed to the beach to assist the shore party
commander and to effectively place Army forces during times of irregular troop arrival. 53
Fourth, the boat repair party repairs landing vessels that sustained casualties during the
approach and landing of Army forces on the beach. 54 Fifth and finally, medical service
responsibility on the beachfront is split into two areas. 55 The Army is responsible for
bringing men from the battle line to the hostile shoreline where the Navy assumes
responsibility from this hostile shoreline to the designated friendly shoreline.
Upon either successful completion or deemed failure, troop withdrawal may
occur. It is vital the withdrawal occurs with a level of secrecy and with maintained air
superiority. To the greatest extent possible, the withdrawal will stand by until favorable
weather conditions are met as determined by the naval areological service. The final
decision to withdrawal is made jointly by the Army and Navy commanders in control of
the amphibious landing and approved by the authority having jurisdiction over the joint
operation.
Joint Action of the Army and the Navy lays out a specific strategic doctrine for
implementation in amphibious landing operations. While there is residual decisionmaking left to be made at the tactical level, it is vital that there is a clear standard set for
amphibious landing commanders to consider during their planning. The United States
Army and Navy utilized Landing Operations on Hostile Shores to help modernize Joint
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Action of the Army and the Navy, yet the Navy relied more upon their experiences
conducting amphibious landings to draft the more modern landing instruction in War
Instructions 1944.
Landings Leading up to War Instructions 1944
Shortly after Japan’s attack on the United States Naval Base at Pearl Harbor,
Germany and Italy had declared war on the United States on December 11th, 1941. 56
Germany, having experienced success through persistence early on in the war had
defeated the British at Tobruk led by Nazi General Erwin Rommel on the 27th of
November 1941. 57 Needing to act fast, the Allies, through the Combined Chiefs of Staff,
developed a plan to lead an invasion in Northern Africa. The army general they chose to
lead the invasion of North Africa was future Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and
United States President, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower. Due to the unsuccessful Dieppe
Raid in August of 1942, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed that an
attack in North Africa would disrupt Vichy France’s control of the region and open the
Mediterranean Sea for allied shipping lanes. 58
The landing, named Operation Torch would target and land in North Africa on
three fronts: the western task force in Casablanca, the central task force in Oran, and the
eastern task force in Algiers. Operation Torch included American and British military
units consisting of their respective armies and navies. The eastern task force set for
Algiers was the riskiest of the three fronts due to its proximity to other enemy bases and
assets. The assault on Algiers suffered vast casualties from the Axis forces assets
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stationed close to the landing site. 59 Even though the Allied forces undertook severe
losses, the city of Algiers still surrendered at 1800 on the day of the attack. Despite delay
and disruption due to unexpected sandbars, the amphibious landing at Oran was also a
quickly achieved operation. The landing at Safi began on November 8th when French
forces fired upon the American destroyer-transport ship BERNADOU during its approach
to their harbor. According to the plan, land forces were on the beach at Safi by 1600 that
same evening. 60 While only operational for a few months, the carrier, SANTEE (CVE-29),
provided the land troops with the necessary air support. By November 9th, the American
land forces had stifled the French air power and had themselves gone on the offensive
destroying dozens of French air assets. The following day, the operation at Safi was such
a success that some American forces were diverted north to assist in the battle for
Casablanca. 61 The Allied landings in North Africa had turned the tide for the Allies in the
region. The Allies were now on the offensive and showing the German-led Axis forces
that momentum was changing ever so slightly.
The landings during Operation Torch taught the United States important lessons
for executing amphibious landings moving forward. As evidenced in the changes to U.S.
amphibious landing doctrine, Operation Torch taught the United States that the full
utilization of naval and air assets to support the beach-embarking land troops was a
catalyst to the success of the landings. Joint considerations for the operational
environment was also a key takeaway from Operation Torch. On one front there was an
environmental obstacle in the form of a sandbar that briefly hindered the United States
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Navy’s operational capabilities and on another front was the unfamiliarity of the
adversary's capabilities. Moving forward the United States and its allies would take these
key lessons from Operation Torch and ensure that future landings would not embrace the
same difficulties.
Following the success of Operation Torch, the next step for the advance of Allied
forces was to move forward onto Italy. The foundation for further operations in Italy was
to be laid by Operation Husky with the natural landings site for the Allies being Sicily. 62
While initially unsure of the strategic value of the operation, the Allies realized that the
success of the operation would “divert and disperse Axis forces, and… significantly
lessen the presence of enemy air assets in the western Mediterranean”. 63 Official
planning for Operation Husky began in February of 1943 and concluded with landing

Map of the planned sites for the amphibious landings for Operation Torch. Also shown is
which Task Forces and nations deployed to each site.
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rehearsals from the 22nd of June to the 4th of July. 64 Further building upon the success of
Operation Torch, the Allies used their new site at Oran as the staging port for Operation
Husky. 65 Following the mitigation of weather delays and operational hindrances, D-Day
for Operation Husky commenced on July 10th, 1943 with the landing of “over 3,200
ships, craft, and boats made up the Allied naval forces, of which more than 1,700
comprised the Western Naval Task Force”. 66 Early in the execution of Operation Husky
the landing efforts were largely successful with the only main challenge coming from a
German tank conducting a counter-attack within one 1,000 yards of Allied forces. This
Axis offensive was efficiently secured through the naval gunfire support provided by
Allied cruisers and destroyers. 67 Further operational success by the Allied forces in Sicily
allowed for the capital of Palermo to be occupied by U.S. Army personnel by the 22nd of
July. 68
The lessons that not only the United States but other Allied nations learned during
Operation Husky would prove important for the planning of further landing operations;
especially Operation Overlord in France. 69 The weather issues that delayed the landing
forces during Operation Husky went to further highlight the importance of weather
considerations in landing operations planning. Also, the United States realized training
issues lead to extended operations in Sicily and with more training time the success
would have been more quickly achieved. 70 Moving forward the Allies realized that the
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mitigation of these issues would allow them to be a more effective landing force for
continued landing operations. These lessons learned by the United States Navy during
Operation Husky built upon those learned during Operation Torch the prior November
and made the Allied forces ready for further landing success. 71
The amphibious landing success experienced by Allied forces in North Africa and
Sicily allowed for further Allied operations in mainland Italy. Operation Shingle was a
planned amphibious assault landing in Italy at the town of Anzio. Anzio is a town on the
western coast of Italy approximately 35 miles from Rome. The objective of Operation
Shingle was to open the road to Rome to the Allies and drive the Nazi forces north of
Rome. 72 To accomplish this goal, the U.S. VI Corps led by Major General John P.
Lucas would land in Anzio with naval support commanded by Rear Admiral Frank J.
Lowry. Consisting of 28 destroyers, 103 minor warships, and 241 landing crafts, the
American amphibious force arrived off the coast of Anzio around midnight on January
22nd with the assault on the beach starting two hours later. 73 Calm seas at the time of the
landing lead to efficient operations with the first loss coming eight hours after the
commencement of the attack. The first loss was AM-106 PORTENT, a minesweeping
ship that sank resulting in the loss of 18 men due to striking a mine. By the end of the
first day, over 90% of the initially planned assault was on the beach at Anzio. The
success came as a surprise due to issues arising from the preparatory phase of the
amphibious landing. 74 While the initial stages of the landing were a success, the time
taken by Allied forces to concentrate their forces and consolidate the beach had allowed
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the Germans to obtain reinforcements and pause the Allied advance through counterattacks. This counter-attack pushed the Allies all the way back to the shoreline.
However, due to naval artillery and gunfire support to the land units, the Allies were able
to hold a strong position on the beach until May of 1944. Allied forces south of the
amphibious landing penetrated the Gustav Line during Operation Diadem to help finally
push the Germans north of Rome. Rome eventually fell on June 4th, 1944.
More than 23,000 British and American combat casualties with an estimated
4,400 deaths occurred during Operation Shingle. Of these 4,400 deaths, 160 were U.S.
Navy personnel killed at Anzio. Although the landing took longer than expected and the
casualties were greater than predicted, Operation Shingle led to a more experienced

Operation Shingle and the assault on Italy. The Gustav Line crossed by Allied forces
leading to the liberation of Rome.
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amphibious assault force and provided lessons on troop placement and movement for
future amphibious landings. 75 The United States learned an even more important lesson
on amphibious landings from Operation Shingle; the need for a structured beach and
properly guided land forces to keep consistent pressure on the adversary. 76 During
Operation Shingle, the Axis land forces were able to regroup and conduct a counterassault on the opposing landing forces due to the United States' inability to exhibit
constant pressure. Had the United States been able to keep the forces on the beach
organized and the pressure consistently applied on the adversary, the Axis land forces
would not have had time to regroup and mount their counter-offensive. This lesson
would prove to be of vital interest to the United States and their allies moving forward
with the Normandy landing occurring just two days after the fall of Rome.
The Normandy landings, named Operation Overlord, was a planned amphibious
landing on the French coast over the English Channel. Landings were to be made by the
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United States, Britain, and Canada on five different beaches. Utah and Omaha beaches
would be attacked by the Americans, while Gold and Sword would be the responsibility
of the British forces leaving the final beach, Juno, to the Canadians.
The operation, if successful, was an important strategic land objective for the
Allied forces. The Allied forces needed access to the western front in Europe to stage
further offensive objectives. The goal was to have the ability to maintain 26-30 divisions
in the area with the deployment of an additional five divisions per month. 77 Deemed
Hitler’s Festung Europa (Europe Fortress), Western Europe would be a vital asset for
further successful Allied operations. 78 The naval component of Operation Overlord was
called Operation Neptune and was led by the Royal Navy’s Admiral Sir Bertram H.
Ramsay. United States Navy Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest King formed a
task force to command the cross-channel assault. Accompanying the stockpile of air
units stationed in England, all 284 warships, including 5 battleships, 23 cruisers, and a
plethora of destroyers/destroyer escorts lined up at the rendezvous point of ‘Piccadilly
Circus”. 79
The Allies had learned from the previous amphibious landings in Italy and North
Africa that maintaining air superiority in the area of operations, weather, and proper
naval gunfire support would be vital to mission success. 80 The weather was of main
consideration to tactical planners due to this operational emphasis on air superiority.
Beach obstacles being exposed to low water was deemed an additional optimal
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circumstance and would occur during a spring tide. 81 Originally scheduled for May 31st,
1944 82, the actual invasion did not occur until June 6th due to these weather requirements.
Time of the day for the invasion was determined to satisfy the requirement in the
amphibious operations doctrine, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, of permitting
enough daylight to achieve the first phase of objectives. In a letter from the Supreme
Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), Operation Overlord was set to
have two phases. Phase 1 was instructed to be “… an assault landing on the
NORMANDY beaches between the limits of QUINEVILLE in the WEST and
CABOURG-LES-BAIRS in the EAST, to be followed by early capture and development
of airfield sites and the capture of the port of CHERBOURG”. 83 Following phase 1,
phase 2 simply enlarged the captured area outlined in phase 1 to the ports of
CHERBORG, LOIRE, and BRITTANY. 84 To accomplish these phases, SHAEF
inventoried the available naval and ground forces available for use in the operation. The
ground forces were to consist of the First US Army Group, 21 Army Group, and requisite
airborne and ranger forces as deemed necessary, while the naval forces consisted of the
same units aforementioned. 85 The final stage in planning set the main base for the
invasion as the United Kingdom.
While most of the amphibious landing was planned out in accordance with
amphibious doctrine, the Allied forces realized that the invasion was so intricate that it
may involve deviations from the planning and doctrine. 86
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Commencing in the early morning of June 6th, 1944, 24,000 airborne personnel
from the U.S., Canada, and Britain were deployed to land in Normandy. 87 At 0630 the
amphibious landing on the coast of France had officially begun. While the waves of
assault on Utah beach was conducted with slight deviation on schedule, the outcome of
operations on Omaha Beach became increasingly grim. 88 Allied forces, accompanied
with successive waves of reinforcements, were constantly hammered by Nazi gunfire
further up on the beach. Destroyer captains were instructed that only half of the
ammunition carried by the destroyers were to be used during the invasion. After
realizing that the situation at Omaha Beach was more severe than expected, destroyer
captains decided to deviate from this instruction, and conduct an all-out assault on Nazi
forces in support of the land troops. In an effort to create a more favorable operational
environment, naval support fire was directed to provide close fire support to troops on the
beach from screening possible enemy invasions. 89 This support from the naval assets
required they station so close to the shore that some of the ships were hit by bullets from
German machine guns and rifles. These ships experienced damage to their hulls and
superstructures. 90 While this was a significant and positive turning point in the
amphibious operation, it was also a deviation from the amphibious landing doctrine.
Historian Craig Symonds spoke of this deviation as “what saved the day for the
Allies…”. 91
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Naval destroyers provided gunfire support destroying enemy gun positions and
allowed Allied land forces to advance b on the beach. In total, 132,500 allied forces were
able to land ashore on D-Day and establish a strong Allied presence for future shipping of
supplies. The follow-on supplies empowered the Allies to push the Germans back to the
forest of Cerisy by June 11th. 92 Resulting in the enemy being too far beyond the range of
Allied ships. Reaching the Seine River in Paris in August of 1944 marked the end of the
amphibious landing operation. 93 Operation Overlord was a success and led to further
Allied operations in Europe. Almost 11 weeks after the invasion, the Allies liberated
Paris and continued to move in on the Germans. Following the liberation of Paris, the
Germans had to now split their land forces between the eastern front (United States,
Britain, and Canada) and the western front (Russia). 94 With forces being spread thin and
the losses increasing by the day, the Germans surrendered to the Allied forces on May 7th,
1945. 95
Operation Overlord is arguably the land equivalent to the Battle of Midway; the
turning point for land operations in World War 2 that ultimately led to the Allied victory
over the Nazis. Operation Overlord proved that with sufficient planning, effective force
employment, and adequate attention placed upon the operational environment, that the
United States and its allies could change the course of any war or conflict with its
amphibious forces. Allied Forces learned that aspects relating to amphibious doctrine
like launching the invasion with adequate daylight remaining to complete first phase
objectives and full implementation of forces were vital to operational success. They also
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learned that doctrine and planning is not always something that has to be followed down
to the number or letter. While the invasion was a short-term success in helping to win the
war for the Allies, it was a long-term success in that it led to the further success of
amphibious landings.
The lessons the United States learned through Operation Torch, Shingle, and
Overlord were significant in achieving subsequent success. Moving forward toward the
end of the war, the United States sought to cement the lessons learned in Normandy,
North Africa, and Italy and ensure amphibious landing success in future conflicts. The
United States Navy took these lessons and used them to optimize their landing doctrine
moving forward through War Instructions 1944.
War Instructions 1944
War Instructions 1944 is the resulting doctrine from the aforementioned landings
that outlined standard operating procedures and operations for “ships, fleets, and
encounters with the enemy”. 96 War Instructions 1944 was the subsequent issuance of
doctrine published by the Chief of Naval Operations following War Instructions 1934.
The 1944 version was approved by Chief of Naval Operations E.J. King and was pushed
out to the fleet on November 1st, 1944.
War Instructions 1944 describes the goal of naval command as “the unity of effort
toward a common objective”. 97 The commander, in this case, the highest-ranking in the
chain of command, may decentralize (delegate) his authority to appropriately trained and
adequate subordinates. Decentralizing authority does not relieve the commander of his
responsibility, it merely passes on the duty of execution. The proper exercise of naval
96
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command occurs when a directive to carry out a task is issued by the commander to
officers of the immediately preceding echelon. This directive must be commensurate
with the directed officer’s authority and responsibility. If carried out with mutual
understanding and the subordinate officer carries out the directive as the commander
would have otherwise, then unity of effort has resulted. Unity of effort is essential to
effective naval command. 98
Six general doctrines of action were set in War Instructions 1944 to govern naval
operations during the war. First, commanders were instructed to ensure that their
subordinate commands understood and concentrated on the objectives at hand and
subsequently focused all efforts on achieving the set objective. Secondly, provide
subordinate units with the materials necessary to utilize maximum force for achieving the
objective. Third, conceal weakness and retain the offensive spirit of the unit. Fourth,
when attacking the enemy focus on disorganizing them through retaining offensive
initiative. Fifth, once initial success has been realized, extend the success to annihilate
the enemy. Finally, utilize the element of surprise when attacking the enemy and ensure
that you and your units are not surprised by the enemy. The commander will only know
what resources are needed by his subordinate units if these units understand the mission
and convey to the commander what resources they need to achieve the objective. Once
the commander provides adequate resources to his units, the units are apt for battle and it
is then back to the commander to set the spirit of his men during periods of success and
failure. When succeeding, it is the commander’s duty to extend the victory and fully
annihilate the enemy while utilizing the element of surprise.
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All these general doctrines of actions are derived from lessons the United States Navy
learned through Operation Overlord, Torch, and Shingle. Operation Torch taught the
Navy the importance of utilizing maximum force to achieve the objective. Operation
Overlord showed the Navy the need to utilize the element of surprise, retaining offensive
initiative, and having a properly equipped force.
The United States Navy learned the importance of a well-darkened ship during
Operation Overlord. Successfully carrying out Operation Overlord required both the
Army and the Navy to utilize the element of surprise through conducting operations
during the night. Landing troops during periods of darkness allowed for optimal
implementation of the element of surprise which was dependent on a darkened ship. If a
ship was not properly darkened, then the Army and Navy would not have experienced the
element of surprise that was instrumental in the success with Operation Overlord.
An essential foundation for conducting amphibious landings is scouting operations.
Scouting operations utilize the maximum employment of aircraft and radar. During
World War II, the Department of the Navy believed that all scouting operations could be
conducted with aircraft. 99 Although aviation assets were heavily utilized by the Navy
during World War II, cases of extreme weather, major distance from bases or surface
assets, harsh sea conditions, and far distances from the enemy require the employment of
alternative collection assets. 100 Regardless of assets utilized for scouting operations, there
are three phases followed for effective results.
The first phase is search operation. Search operations are initiated by an officer who
designates the area, units to be utilized, and the commander in charge. To conduct the
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search operation, the initiating officer identifies the search area and assigns each scout in
the search operation with specific tasks. The commander in charge of the search is
provided information from the scouts to which he provides to the initiating officer as
frequently and necessary and as possible. 101 The information provided from the
commander in charge of the search to the initiating officer may include but is not limited
to enemy contacts, friendly casualties significantly affecting the operation, and timesensitive information requirements. The next step of scouting operations is contact
scouting which encompasses both tactical scouting and tracking. In contrast to search
operations, a “scout” in contact scouting refers to an aviation asset instead of a human
asset. Unless the main object of the search is to contact the enemy, the scout is to not
concentrate on making the first contact. If the scout does contact an adversary force, then
the scout must focus on collecting information on the unit and reporting the contact to the
commander. Surface scouts (ships) who contact enemy vessels or scouts shall only
engage the enemy if vital to continue the operation. If attempting to pass through enemy
units to locate an objective or continue scouting operations, friendly surface vessels
should attempt to do so without making contact with the enemy. 102 When aviation assets
are the feasible means of locating an objective or developing contacts, they shall be
effectively employed. Thirdly, tracking occurs when the adversary is located but is not
within the striking area of an adequate force. Once the objective of a scouting operation
has been located and identified, the senior officer takes the necessary measure to maintain
the track of the contact. This tracking is maintained until an adequate unit is within range
to strike. The goal of tracking is to maintain and monitor the location of enemy forces a
101
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minimum of once per day. The utilization of sonar mitigates the effects of the intricacies
and dangers of ocean navigation. Finally, tactical scouting provides detailed information
on the enemy through close-quarters collection. This detailed information is provided to
the officer in tactical command by the commander (senior officer of the scouts) for
tactical decision making and planning prior to principal force engagement. Tactical
scouting is continued on through the engagement with the transition from surface vessels
to aviation assets and complimented by flank forces and submarines. Scouting is a vital
evolution directly associated with the planning and execution of naval operations during
World War II.
Leading up to Operation Overlord, the United States Navy undertook extensive
scouting operations to attempt to paint a full picture of the landing operational
environment. These scouting operations were vital to the success of Operation Overlord
because it allowed the United States and other Allied forces to better plan and execute the
Normandy landing. This emphasized role of scouting was due to the shortcomings of
Operation Torch where the United States failed to account for all aspects of the
operational environment to include the physical environment and also the adversary’s
capabilities. Scouting operations allowed the United States to better ascertain the
capabilities of the adversary forces on the beachhead and be better equipped to combat
these capabilities. Moving forward with War Instructions 1944, the United States wanted
to be sure that scouting operations were utilized to their fullest extent so that landing
forces would be adequately equipped, and the landing would be expeditious.
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Conclusion
War Instructions 1944 was the culmination of the United States’ amphibious doctrine
in World War II. With Landing Operations on Hostile Shores heavily influencing Joint
Action of the Army and the Navy, the United States went through most of World War II
following these pieces of amphibious landing doctrine. After various lessons learned
through Operations Torch, Shingle, and Overlord, the United States realized that they
may have found a formula for amphibious success. Wanting to create an allencompassing doctrine to capitalize on these lessons through War Instructions 1944, the
United States created an experienced-based doctrine that would set their amphibious
force up for sustained success. The amphibious landing doctrine for the United States
throughout World War II had adapted in an effective way that leads to the United States
ending the war with the world's top amphibious landing force.
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